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D URING the survey period Texas courts handed down numerous
decisions involving various rules of evidence. The cases of greatest
interest lie in the following substantive areas: (1) expert opinion evidence;
(2) evidence of settlement; (3) the hearsay rule and its exceptions; (4) cor-
roboration of accomplice testimony; (5) tape recordings; (6) damages; (7)
jury misconduct; and (8) parol evidence.
I. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Competency
Whether the person offered as an expert possesses the required qualifica-
tions is a preliminary question to be determined by the trial court.' The
party offering the testimony of an alleged expert has the burden of estab-
lishing the expert's qualifications.2 Trick v. Trick3 presented the question
of whether a party had met this burden. In Trick, a divorce case that in-
volved the value of stock in a medical professional association, the appel-
lant complained of the trial court's refusal to permit her proposed expert to
testify concerning the value of the parties' stock in the medical association.
The proposed expert was a high school graduate and had attended the
Southwestern Graduate School of Banking at Southern Methodist Univer-
sity, but he did not have a college degree. He had served as a vice presi-
dent of two separate banks, had been president of a bank for
approximately six months, and had been in the banking business for ap-
proximately twenty years. At the time of trial, however, he was an official
of a chemical company. During questioning on voir dire examination, the
proposed expert admitted that he did not belong to any professional orga-
nizations or societies, that he was not an accountant, and that he did not
subscribe to any trade publications. He also admitted that he had never
previously evaluated the stock of a professional association. The court of
civil appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in exclud-
ing the testimony of the witness. 4 Reasoning that the witness had never
evaluated stock of a professional corporation in twenty years of banking
* LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston,
Texas.
1. See generally 2 R. RAY, TEXAs LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1401 (Texas Practice 3d ed.
1980).
2. Id
3. 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ dism'd).
4. Id at 773.
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business and had no expertise for making such an evaluation, the appellate
court held that the trial court properly concluded that the witness did not
possess the requisite qualifications.5
B. Underling Data
Moore v. Grantham6 addressed the perennial inquiry concerning the ex-
tent to which an expert's opinion may be based on hearsay. Moore in-
volved an action for damages resulting from personal injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had been
trained and had worked as an interior designer. She testified that she had
attempted to return to interior design work after the accident, but that her
injuries had precluded her from doing so. To meet her burden of proof
with respect to loss of future earning capacity, the plaintiff called as an
expert witness the Director of the Rehabilitation Counselor Education
Program, who was a professor at the University of Texas. The expert ad-
mitted that he had no personal knowledge of the interior design profes-
sion. Rather, in preparation for his testimony, the witness had referred to
Department of Labor and Manpower publications as well as correspon-
dence from the plaintiffs former employers and clients. The witness also
had interviewed a university home economics professor specializing in in-
terior design and had conducted a survey of local interior design busi-
nesses. At trial, however, the plaintiff did not introduce into evidence any
of these external sources relied upon by the expert. The trial court allowed
the plaintiffs expert to testify that in his opinion the plaintiff's loss of fu-
ture earning capacity was the difference between the plaintiffs future ca-
reer expectancy as an interior decorator and her current employment as
assistant manager of a retail store. On appeal, the defendant attacked the
jury's award of damages for the plaintiffs loss of future earning capacity,
contending that the testimony of the plaintiffs expert on damages was
based wholly on hearsay and therefore was inadmissible. The court of
civil appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that once an expert is quali-
fied the issue of admissibility becomes whether the sources of information
relied upon by the expert are of the type reasonably and customarily relied
upon by experts in that particular field.7 The court also stated that the
recent trend of judicial decisions was to treat objections such as that made
by the defendant as merely going to the weight rather than to the admissi-
bility of the evidence.8
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals and held that "an expert's opinion may not be based solely on the
5. Id
6. 599 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1980). For an excellent discussion of the extent to which an
expert's opinion may be based on hearsay, see Comment, The Physician's Testimony -Hear-
say Evidence or Expert Opinion:. A Question of Professional Competence, 53 TEXAs L. REV.
296 (1975). See also Comment, The Expert Witness. Hearsay vs. Opinion, 24 BAYLOR L.
REV. 108 (1972).




statements or reports of third persons, unless those statements are properly
in evidence and the opinion is sought through hypothetical questions."9
The court stated that "[w]hile the courts have adopted a more liberal ap-
proach in allowing an expert's opinion testimony to be based partially on
hearsay,. . . this Court has yet to adopt a rule permitting an expert's opin-
ion testimony to be based solely on hearsay."' 0 The court observed" l that
it had rejected such a broad rule of admissibility in two recent decisions,
Slaughter v. Abilene State School' 2 and Lewis v. Southmore Savings Associ-
ation 13 In Slaughter the testifying doctor had not based his expert opin-
ion solely on the patient's history as told by the patient; rather, the expert
gained personal knowledge of the patient's condition by making a physical
examination and by taking and examining x-rays. Similarly, in Lewis
there was substantial evidence, based on the personal knowledge of the
expert witness, to support the commissioner's order not to exclude the ex-
pert's testimony. 14 The supreme court in Moore observed that the court of
civil appeals had misread these decisions.' 5 The expert witness in Moore
admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the wage scale in the inte-
rior design field. Consequently, instead of partially relying on outside
sources, the expert in Moore relied totally on such sources for his testi-
mony.16
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Carnine17 the plaintiff
presented the testimony of a medical doctor, who, in testifying concerning
his diagnosis, relied in part upon a radiologist's report. The x-rays upon
which the radiologist's report was based were not offered into evidence.
The court of civil appeals followed the rationale of Slaughter v. Abilene
State School 8 and held that such evidence was admissible because the
doctor's testimony was predicated both on personal knowledge and hear-
say.19 The doctor testified that he had examined the plaintiff on two occa-
sions prior to the date the x-rays were taken. He described numerous tests
that he performed on the plaintiff on those occasions, testifying that after
his initial examination, but prior to the taking of the x-rays, he believed
the plaintiff had sustained a serious injury. Consequently, the doctor's
opinion was correctly admitted into evidence. Unlike the situation
9. 599 S.W.2d at 289.
10. Id (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
11. Id
12. 561 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1977).
13. 480 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1972).
14. The Texas Supreme Court in Moore also indicated that the opinion in Lewis was
not an opinion of the Texas Supreme Court. Although all nine justices agreed to the judg-
ment, six justices concurred only in the result reached. 599 S.W.2d at 289 n.2.
15. Id at 289-90.
16. Id at 290-91, The holding in Moore subsequently was followed in Texas Mun.
Power Agency v. Berger, 600 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no
writ).
17. 601 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
18. 561 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1977).
19. 601 S.W.2d at 392.
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presented in Moore v. Grantham ,20 the expert's opinion was not predicated
solely on hearsay.
C. Standard of Care
In Texas a patient ordinarily has no cause of action against his doctor
for malpractice unless he proves by a doctor of the same school of practice
as the defendant that the diagnosis or treatment complained of was such as
to constitute negligence and that it was the proximate cause of the patient's
injuries. 21 The testifying expert cannot establish the requisite standard by
stating what he would have done under the same or similar circumstances;
rather, he must testify as to what the standard itself is.22
In Bearce v. Bowers 23 the trial court rendered judgment for the defend-
ant doctor at the close of the plaintiffs case because the plaintiff had failed
to establish the requisite standard of care. The medical doctor called as an
expert witness by the plaintiff was not questioned concerning the standard
of care. Instead, the questions concerned what that doctor would have
done under the circumstances. 24 Affirming the trial court, the court of civil
appeals concluded that "[w]hat Dr. Whitehouse personally would or
would not have done under the same circumstances confronting [the de-
fendant] is insufficient to establish the requisite standard. '25
20. 599 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1980).
21. See Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949).
22. For example, a medical expert is not competent to express an opinion as to what
constitutes malpractice or negligence, or what a reasonable and prudent doctor would have
done under the same or similar circumstances. Snow v. Bond, 438 S.W.2d 549, 550-51 (Tex.
1969). The rationale for these restrictions is that these opinions constitute conclusions that
only the trier of facts may draw, and therefore they invade the province of the jury. Con-
versely, Texas courts have allowed medical experts to testify that medical practices are cor-
rect in certain circumstances, Prestegord v. Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1969), that
certain hypothetical acts are against standard medical practice, Cleveland v. Edwards, 494
S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ), and that certain acts
fall below the standard of conduct of other doctors practicing in the area, Martisek v. Ains-
worth, 459 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. 587 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
24. For example, the expert was asked: "Doctor, .. what... wouldyou have done
T' Id at 219 (emphasis in original).
25. Id The identical issue arose in Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.), a medical malpractice case in which the
trial court granted the doctor's motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff appealed, urging
the appellate court to adopt an expanded view as to when the requisite standard of care is
established. The appellate court refused to expand the existing law, concluding that the
evidence established only what the plaintiff's expert witness "would have done and what he
thought was a proper use of the diagnostic tools available to [the defendant] in examining
the plaintiff." Id at 333 (emphasis in original). The court followed the line of Texas cases
that holds that the standard of care may not be established by the expert's opinion testimony
that the defendant-doctor's treatment constituted negligence. Id Accordingly, because the
expert failed to establish a standard of diagnostic procedure considered acceptable by medi-
cal doctors, no fact issue of negligence was raised by the plaintiff, and the trial court's deci-




In Schaeffer v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association,26 a workers'
compensation case, the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite causal con-
nection between the disease and his employment because the testimony of
his expert witness failed to rise to the level of reasonable medical
probability. In Schaeffer the jury found that the atypical tuberculosis suf-
fered by the plaintiff was an occupational disease that resulted in total and
permanent disability. Two medical experts testified at the trial, the plain-
tiff's treating physician and the defendant's expert witness. The issue
raised by the defendant on appeal was whether the testimony of the plain-
tiffs expert constituted some evidence of probative force to support the
jury finding that the plaintiff was exposed to his medical condition while in
the course and scope of his employment. Reversing the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court held that there was no evidence of probative
force to support the jury's finding.27
After reviewing the testimony of the plaintiff's doctor, 28 the Texas
Supreme Court held that the expert's opinion was not based upon reason-
able medical probability, but instead relied on "mere possibility, specula-
tion, and surmise."' 29 The court reasoned that even though proof of
causation of the particular disease involved was difficult, such difficulty
did not excuse the plaintiff from introducing some evidence of causation. 30
Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]o ignore the substance of [the ex-
pert's] testimony and accept his opinion as 'some' evidence simply because
he used the magic words 'reasonable probability' effectively removes this
Court's jurisdiction over any case requiring expert opinion testimony."'3'
II. EVIDENCE OF SETTLEMENT
Texas adheres to the rule that information concerning settlement agree-
ments should be excluded from jury consideration because the settlement
may be misconstrued as an admission of liability. 32 That rule, however, is
26. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 163 (Dec. 30, 1980).
27. 598 S.W.2d 924, 927-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
28. The plaintiff's expert witness testified that in his opinion, based on reasonable medi-
cal probability, the plaintiff's disease resulted from his employment:
Q. [Aissume the term occupational disease means a disease which arises out
of and in course of employment which causes damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and I'll ask you whether or not you have an
opinion based on reasonable medical probability as to whether the atypi-
cal tuberculosis from which Mr. Schaeffer is suffering, as it applies to his
case, whether it is an occupational disease within the definition?
A. Yes, sir. I think it is.
24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 165.
29. Id at 167; see Beck, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 357, 361-64
(1980).
30. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 167.
31. Id The question on appeal would be one of sufficiency of the evidence, and the
sup reme court has no jurisdiction over such a question. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
1728 (Vernon 1962).
32. See McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1968).
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not without exception. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Sim-
mons 33 the Texas Supreme Court held that evidence of a Mary Carter
settlement agreement 34 was admissible to enable a party to discredit wit-
nesses for the settling defendant who, as a result of the settlement, actually
retained a financial interest in the success of the plaintiffs recovery.
35
In City of Houston v. Sam P. Wallace & Co. 36 the question arose whether
a settlement agreement resulted in the parties being misaligned at the ar-
gument stage of the trial. One of the plaintiffs, the city of Houston, argued
that its motion for a mistrial should have been granted because a settling
co-plaintiff, Little, was allowed to argue to the jury after he had settled his
action against Wallace. Little had no action against any party other than
Wallace. Counsel for the other plaintiff advised the jury panel on voir dire
examination that the evidence would show that the defendant Wallace was
in control of the premises and that Wallace was the negligent party. The
record revealed that while the jury was deliberating, and at a time when
counsel for the city of Houston was out of the courtroom, counsel for Little
orally asked the court to grant a nonsuit of his action against Wallace. The
city of Houston was not informed of the dismissal. During jury argument,
Little's counsel did not argue that his client and the city of Houston should
win as he suggested to the jury panel on voir dire; instead, he argued that
defendant Wallace should win. The jury, apparently believing that Little
became convinced of the error of his contentions, returned a verdict that
defeated the city of Houston's cause of action. On the basis of that verdict,
the trial court entered a judgment for the defendant. 37 The court of civil
appeals affirmed, 38 and the city petitioned for review.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that "Little's posture in the case
during jury argument was a subterfuge. His real mission was not to win as
a plaintiff, but to defeat his co-plaintiffs action which he did."' 39 Although
the defendant contended that its settlement agreement with Little was not
a Mary Carter agreement, the court found that Mary Carter agreements
and the misalignment of the parties that resulted from the present agree-
ment "possess a more basic vice. Both of them are false and misleading
portrayals to the jury of the real interest of the parties and witnesses." 40
Because the trial was not a fair adversary proceeding, the court reversed
33. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
34. The Mary Carter settlement agreement originated in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint
Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In this type of settlement one of the tortfeasors
contractually agrees to aid the plaintiff in his suit against the remaining tortfeasor in consid-
eration for recovering a portion of the plaintiffs judgment. Although the Texas Supreme
Court subsequently has discussed the effect of this form of settlement agreement, see Bristol-
Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978), the validity of Mary Carter settlement
agreements has not yet been squarely decided by the court. See Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. Perez,
591 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
35. 558 S.W.2d at 857.
36. 585 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1979).
37. Id at 670.
38. 574 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978).
39. 585 S.W.2d at 673.
40. Id. at 674.
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and remanded the case for a new trial.4'
III. THE HEARSAY RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. Declaration Against Interest
One of the oldest exceptions to the hearsay rule involves a declaration
against interest, which is a statement contrary to the pecuniary or proprie-
tary interest of the declarant. 42 A declaration against interest is ordinarily
admissible if (1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness at the time of
trial;43 (2) the declaration was against the declarant's pecuniary or proprie-
tary interest; (3) the statement is a fact of which the declarant was person-
ally cognizant; and (4) the declarant had no possible motive to falsify the
act declared.44 Because the declaration against interest must be against the
pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant, it is insufficient if the
statement merely subjects the declarant to criminal liability. 45 The ration-
ale for the distinction is that the admission of a declaration against penal
interests could lead to the presentation of perjured testimony because con-
fessions of criminal activity often are motivated by extraneous considera-
tions and therefore are not as inherently reliable as declarations against
pecuniary interest.46
In Hill v. Robinson47 the plaintiffs sued for damages under the wrongful
death statute for the murder of a doctor, alleging that the doctor was killed
as a result of a murder-for-hire conspiracy perpetrated by the defendants.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, 48 and the
plaintiffs appealed. In order to establish their allegations of conspiracy,
the plaintiffs sought to introduce the out-of-court confession of a then-de-
ceased ex-convict implicating the defendant Robinson and two others.49
The court of civil appeals sustained the defendants' objection to the intro-
duction of the confession. 50 Although the court acknowledged that no
civil case in this state definitively holds that a declaration against penal
interest is inadmissible, the court nonetheless held that the confession was
properly excluded as it could find no compelling reason to depart from the
majority practice of excluding declarations against penal interest.5 ' The
court further stated that in order to be admissible, the declaration, whether
it be against the pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest of the declarant,
41. Id
42. IA R. RAY, supra note 1, §§ 1001-1011.
43. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heard & Jones Drug Stores, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 911
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, no writ).
44. See, e.g., Duncan v. Smith, 393 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1965).
45. See IA R. RAY, supra note 1, § 1005; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
46. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1972).
47. 592 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
48. Id at 379.
49. These other two alleged co-conspirators previously were convicted for the murder of
the doctor. Id




must possess some degree of reliability. 52 At the time the declarant gave
his confession, he was in police custody facing a habitual criminal indict-
ment that could have resulted in an automatic life sentence. He also was
offered a lesser term if he cooperated. The court concluded that under the
circumstances some doubt existed as to whether the confession possessed
the requisite indicia of reliability to warrant its admission into evidence.5 3
Accordingly, the court held that the question of whether the confession
was admissible was a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
5 4
In Car, Ltd v. Smith, 55 an automobile. accident case, the trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed. The
defendants attacked the trial court's exclusion of certain testimony by two
witnesses concerning conversations they had had with Beasley, a driver of
one of the two vehicles involved in the accident. Beasley was a porter
employed by the defendant and was driving a customer's car; he purport-
edly told the two witnesses that he did not have permission to take the car.
The defendants argued that Beasley's statements were admissible as decla-
rations against his interest. The court of civil appeals held that the state-
ments attributed to Beasley were not against his pecuniary or proprietary
interest when made.56 The court stated that whether Beasley was driving
the vehicle with his employer's permission and whether he was on an er-
rand for his employer would in no way affect Beasley's own liability for his
negligent act.57 Accordingly, the court reasoned that Beasley's ultimate
liability would not have been affected by his out-of-court statement. 58
B. Admissions
In Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. ,9 a
workers' compensation case, the plaintiff claimed that a change in his
physical condition entitled him to an increase in his workers' compensa-
tion benefits. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict in the
plaintiffs favor.60 The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered a take-
nothing judgment, holding that the plaintiffs testimony that he was totally
unable to work prior to the Insurance Accident Board award in dispute




55. 590 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Id at 742.
57. Id at 741-42.
58. Id Furthermore, the court concluded that the record did not demonstrate conclu-
sively that Beasley was unavailable as a witness, and that, therefore, one of the prerequisites
for introducing a declaration against interest was not established. The court held that in
order for the witness to be unavailable he must be shown to be dead, insane, physically
unable to testify, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or a showing must be made that his
whereabouts are unknown and a diligent search has been made to locate him. Id; see Hall
v. White, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1975).
59. 606 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1980).
60. Id at 693.
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disabled at the time so that there could not have been a subsequent change
in his work capacity on which to base an increased award.6'
Reversing the court of civil appeals, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that the testimonial declarations of a party that are contrary to his position
are quasi-admissions that are not conclusive.62 According to the court, a
testimonial declaration of the type presented in Mendoza will be treated as
a judicial admission only if the statement is "deliberate, clear, and une-
quivocal. The hypothesis of mere mistake or slip of the tongue must be
eliminated. '63 Although the court stated that the appellate court had cor-
rectly set out the requirements for a quasi-admission to be treated as a
conclusive judicial admission, the court found that Mendoza's testimony
did not meet those requirements. 64 The court categorized Mendoza's testi-
mony as merely an opinion concerning his disability and concluded that
Mendoza's opinion testimony as a lay person was not so clear and une-
quivocal as to preclude his recovery as a judicial admission.65
Fuselier v. Dow Chemical Co. 66 presented the question whether an ad-
mission of an attorney is admissible against his client. In Fuselier the
plaintiff argued on appeal that a statement made by defendant's counsel in
a brief filed in an appeal of the venue issue constituted an admission, a
judicial admission, or a prior inconsistent statement. The brief stated that
the evidence at the hearing on the defendant's plea of privilege indicated
negligence on the part of the defendant. In affirming the decision of the
61. 588 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979). The testimony considered by
the court of civil appeals to be a judicial admission of facts conclusively establishing the
plaintiff's total inability to work prior to the original award was as follows:
Q. But on September-in September of 1976, you were totally unable to do
any work?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In October of 1976, you were totally unable to do any kind of work?
A. In October of 1976?
Q. That is still before you were put in the hospital.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Up to November 30, 1976 [the date of the original award], you were to-
tally unable to do any kind of work.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In December of 1976, you were totally unable to do any kind of work?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Right up to the present time?
A. Yes, sir.
Id at 615.
62. 606 S.W.2d at 694; see, e.g., Harris County v. Hall, 141 Tex. 388, 172 S.W.2d 691
(1943). Quasi-admissions differ from judicial admissions because the latter constitute a for-
mal waiver of proof and are normally found in pleadings or in the stipulations of the parties.
Unlike a quasi-admission, a judicial admission is binding upon the party making it. See IA
R. RAY, supra note 1, § 1127.
63. 606 S.W.2d at 694. The court listed the requirements as set forth in United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Car, 242 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ
ref d).
64. 606 S.W.2d at 694-95.
65. 1d at 695. The court stated that such an opinion would require medical knowledge
beyond that of the average lay person and because Mendoza was a lay person, his opinion
could have been wrong. Id
66. 590 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1981]
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trial court, the court of civil appeals held that the prior statement made by
the defendant's attorney concerned the quantity and quality of the evi-
dence introduced at the venue hearing and was not an admission that the
defendant was negligent. 67 Consequently, the court stated that "[w]hether
appellant sought to introduce the prior statement as an admission to be
used as probative evidence or as a prior inconsistent statement for im-
peachment," the statement was inadmissible. 68
At least one case during the survey period highlights the potential risk of
introducing evidence of an opponent's pleading without any limitation on
the offer. In Hackney v. Johnson69 the plaintiff sued her landlord for dam-
ages arising out of an alleged wrongful eviction. At trial the plaintiff of-
fered into evidence without limitation the defendant's first amended
original answer, which consisted of a general denial and various allega-
tions that the plaintiff had breached the lease. On the basis of the jury's
verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff.70 On appeal the
defendant contended that the introduction of the pleading without limita-
tion bound the plaintiff to all of the allegations contained therein and enti-
tled the defendant to an instructed verdict. Texas case law indicates that
when a party offers into evidence a pleading of his opponent without limi-
tation, the allegations contained in such pleading are conclusively estab-
lished.7 1 After acknowledging the harshness of the stated rule,72 the court
held that the plaintiff was not conclusively bound by her introduction of
the defendant's pleadings. 73 Rather, the court affirmed the trial court be-
cause the plaintiff had introduced other evidence that established that the
plaintiff was not in default under her lease. 74
Nu- Way Oil Co. v. Trac- Work, Inc. 75 involved the frequently raised is-
sue of whether the admissions of an employee are admissible against his
employer. 76 In Nu- Way the plaintiff sued a truck driver and his employer
for damages allegedly sustained when the truck struck the plaintiff's gaso-
line pump and sign located at the plaintiffs service station. The employee
did not testify at trial. After the plaintiff rested its case, the employer
moved for and received an instructed verdict. The take-nothing judgment
recited that the evidence was legally insufficient to raise fact issues for the
67. Id at 626.
68. Id
69. 601 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
70. Id at 525.
71. See, e.g., Seddon v. Harrison, 367 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, writ
refd n.r.e.); Lincoln v. Pohly, 325 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); McClung Constr. Co. v. Langford Motor Co., 33 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1930, no writ). The court, however, did not find the case law to be dispositive of the
issue, and indicated that the statements contained in these cases supporting the proposition
have generally been used by those courts as an alternative reason for their decision. 601
S.W.2d at 526.
72. 601 S.W.2d at 526.
73. Id at 527.
74. Id
75. 601 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).




jury on the issues of the employer's negligent entrustment of the vehicle to
its employee, the employee's negligence, and the course and scope of his
employment. On appeal the plaintiff contended that the admissions attrib-
uted to the employee by the investigating police officer to the effect that the
employee did not have a driver's license and that the brakes on the truck
had failed, together with the officer's testimony that the truck had hit a car
from the rear and the presumption that Johnson was driving the truck in
the course of his employment, were sufficient to raise the issue of negligent
entrustment by the employer.
The Waco court of civil appeals, however, held that the evidence was
legally insufficient to raise the issue of negligent entrustment. 77 Although
there was evidence that the vehicle involved in the accident was owned by
the defendant and that the employee was driving the truck when it struck
the plaintiffs gasoline pump, the court found that the presumption of
scope of employment that normally arises under such evidence "vanishes
when there is other evidence showing that the driver was not acting within
the scope of his employment. 78 Even though the court indicated that
there was no such other evidence in the record, it held that there was no
admissible evidence introduced against the employer establishing his neg-
ligence.79 Discussing the employee's admissions to the police officer, the
court stated that the employee's statements were admissible against him,
but that they were hearsay as to the employer and therefore without proba-
tive value toward establishing any essential element of the plaintiffs case
against the employer.80 The judgment in favor of the employer therefore
was affirmed, and the judgment in favor of the employee was reversed.8'
C. Business Records
Notwithstanding the express language of the statutory business records
exception to the hearsay rule,82 several decisions during each survey pe-
77. 601 S.W.2d at 211.
78. Id (citing Robertson Tanklines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.
1971)). Robertson discusses the presumption of scope of employment that can arise and the
evidence necessary to rebut such a presumption.
79. 601 S.W.2d at 211.
80. Id at 212. The court also held that the evidence that the brakes were overhauled 13
days after the accident, standing alone, did not raise an issue that the brakes were defective
at the time of the accident. Id
81. Id.
82. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
Competence of record as evidence
Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall,
insofar as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or
event or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or represen-
tative of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition
to make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be
included in such memorandum of record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
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riod illustrate the repeated failure of counsel to comply with the prerequi-
sites of this exception. For example, in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v.
May83 the plaintiff brought suit against the railroad company for damages
arising from a railroad crossing accident. The trial court entered a take-
nothing judgment for the defendant,84 but the appellate court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.8 5 In its per curiam decision refusing the defend-
ant's application for writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals was correct in holding that it was reversible error for the
trial court to exclude evidence of earlier accidents that occurred under rea-
sonably similar but not necessarily identical circumstances.8 6 The court
cautioned, however, that its disposition of the case should not be construed
as approving the additional holding of the court of civil appeals that the
trial court had erred in admitting the blood-alcohol report as a business
record of the hospital.87 Reasoning that the objections articulated by the
lower court affected only the report's weight and credibility but not its ad-
missibility, the supreme court held that the hospital lab report of the
blood-alcohol test was admissible as a business record of the hospital in
that the requirements of article 3737e88 were met.
8 9
For a report to be admissible under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, article 3737e requires that an employee or representative who
has personal knowledge of the transaction either prepare the record or
transmit the information to another who prepares the record. 90 The com-
petency of a person to testify as to satisfaction of the requirements con-
tained in article 3737e was presented in Knollenberg v. Steel Tank
Construction Co.9 1 In Knollenberg, a sworn account suit, the issue on ap-
peal was whether the document evidencing the account, which was admit-
ted into evidence, was properly proven under article 3737e. The plaintiff
Proof of identity and mode of preparation; lack of personal knowledge
Sec. 2. The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or rec-
ord in accordance with the provisions of paragraph one (1) may be proved by
the testimony of the entrant, custodian or other qualified witness even though
he may not have personal knowledge as to the various items or contents of
such memorandum or record. Such lack of personal knowledge may be
shown to affect the weight and credibility of the memorandum or record but
shall not affect its admissibility.
Sec. 4. "Business" as used in this Act includes any and every kind of regu-
lar organized activity whether conducted for profit or not.
For a discussion of the type of business that may qualify under this statutory exception, see
Note, The Hearsay Rule and the Business Entities Exception, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 700 (1974).
83. 600 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1980).
84. Id at 756.
85. 583 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979).
86. 600 S.W.2d at 756.
87. Id The court of civil appeals held that because the report did not identify the
person taking the blood from the plaintiff and because security measures used for the blood
sample were absent, a chain of custody was not shown establishing that the blood analyzed
actually came from the plaintiff. 583 S.W.2d 694, 700-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979).
88. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see note 82 supra.
89. 600 S.W.2d at 756.
90. See Skillern & Sons v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298, 305 (Tex. 1962).
91. 600 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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presented only one witness, an employee of the plaintiff, who testified that
the company with whom the defendant transacted business assigned its
accounts to the plaintiff. The witness admitted that he did not have per-
sonal knowledge of how the first company handled its business, but he
stated that he had instructed a Mr. Tinsely, who had been a bookkeeper
for the first company, to bring all of that company's accounts up to date.
Tinsley prepared a summary of the defendant's account, and it was this
document that the appellee offered into evidence to prove the account.
The witness testified that Tinsely had personal knowledge of each of the
transactions set forth in the document.
The court of civil appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
held that the witness was not competent to testify that the requirements of
article 3737e were met by employees of the first company because he was
not familiar with that company's operation.92 The court relied on Matrix
Computing, Inc. v. Davis93 and rejected the plaintiffs contention that sec-
tion 2 of article 3737e permits one who has no personal knowledge of the
transaction in question to prove up the document by merely reciting the
language of the three requirements set out in section 1 of the statute. 94 The
court acknowledged, however, that if the witness had been able to testify
from personal knowledge as to the record keeping procedure of the first
company and the preparation of the document by that company in accord-
ance with the requirements of article 3737e, then the document would have
been admissible. 95 In such instance, the court stated that the testimony
would have satisfied section 2 of article 3737e even though the witness had
no personal knowledge of the particular transactions set out in the docu-
ments.96
Similarly, in Brans v. Office Building Managers, Inc. ,97 a suit to collect
rents and service charges alleged to be due and owing under an oral lease
agreement, the plaintiff attempted to prove the defendant's indebtedness
by offering copies of a tenant ledger that its witness testified were repro-
duced from the company's books. As the evidence showed that the witness
did not begin work for the defendant until April 1978, the court initially
stated that he could not possess the personal knowledge required by article
3737e because the transactions involved dealt with rents accrued during
1975 and 1976.98 The court reasoned that the question then was whether
there was proof that the witness was a custodian or other qualified wit-
ness.99 The only evidence relevant to this inquiry was the witness's state-
ment that he was the company's treasurer. Because the duties of a
92. Id at 348-49.
93. 554 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ) (mere recitation of the
statutory predicate by a person who has no personal knowledge of the entries is insufficient
to satisfy the requisites of art. 3737e).
94. 600 S.W.2d at 349.
95. Id.
96. Id
97. 593 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
98. Id at 416.
99. Id.
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subordinate corporate officer cannot be inferred merely from an official
title, but rather are defined in the corporation's bylaws, the court reversed
the trial court and held that this evidence alone was insufficient to prove
that the witness was a custodian of the company's books or was otherwise
qualified. 10
D. Matters Not in Evidence
Visual aids used at trial normally are not considered as evidence be-
cause they do not constitute proof of any fact; they are merely tools used
by trial counsel.10' In Webster College v. Speier 0 2 various police officers
instituted suit under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Pro-
tection Act 103 for the alleged failure of the defendant to abide by its repre-
sentations concerning a course of study in criminal justice. After a jury
trial, judgment was rendered for the police officers. 1°4 The court of civil
appeals reversed, however, and remanded the case for a new trial because
of the particular use by the plaintiffs' attorney of a chart during trial. 05
The chart apparently listed the police officers with a column beside each
name with a space to indicate the various damage items attributable to
each. During the course of the trial the plaintiffs' counsel filled in the
blanks. The court of civil appeals held that the chart was not evidence and
that it was error to admit the chart.106 The court also held that the error
was compounded by the jury's taking the chart to the jury room and re-
sponding to the closing argument of the plaintiffs attorney by reference to
the chart.'0 7 The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ of error on
these evidentiary points.'0 8
In Green v. Remling'0 9 the paternal grandparents and paternal aunt of
three children appealed the trial court's decision allowing the children's
adoption by the Greens, their maternal aunt and uncle. The trial court
had appointed a local agency of the Texas State Department of Human
Resources to prepare a social study concerning the children and the suita-
bility of the Greens' home. The report was filed with the trial court on the
day of the adoption hearing, but it was never formally introduced into
evidence. All parties knew about the appointment of the social worker, the
preparation of the social study, and the contents of the report prior to the
hearing; no objection was made to the appointment, however, and no ob-
100. Id at 415.
101. See 2 R. RAY, supra note I, § 1465. See also Harvey v. State, 389 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. 605 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
103. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
104. 605 S.W.2d at 713.
105. Id at 715.
106. Id at 714.
107. Id The jury awarded damages in the amount set forth on the chart with only one
exception. Id
108. [Editor's Note: After this Article went to print, the Texas Supreme Court reversed
the lower court on the evidentiary issues and rendered judgment for the policemen. 24 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 309, 311 (Mar. 25, 1981). This decision will be discussed in next year's Survey.]
109. 608 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1980).
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jection was made to the contents of the report until after the hearing. 10
Similarly, no effort was made to call the social worker as a witness or to
subpoena her. The trial court allowed the Greens to adopt the children. " I I
The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge com-
mitted reversible error by considering a social study report not in evidence
because it deprived the appellants of their right to cross-examine the au-
thor of the study." 12
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was not error for the
trial court to consider the social study even though it was not in evi-
dence. 11 3 The court acknowledged that the issue of whether a study that
has not been admitted formally into evidence can be considered by the
trial court was one of first impression." 4 The court also stated that al-
though either party has a right to examine the author of the social study,
the respondents in this case did not avail themselves of their adequate op-
portunity to cross-examine the author." 5 More importantly, the court
seemed impressed with the fact that trial courts need an impartial source of
information to guide them in suits involving the parent-child relationship
and that, in recognition of this burden, the legislature had provided for the
compilation of an independent social study to aid the court in its determi-
nation. 116 As only one statement in the social study was not cumulative of
other evidence adduced at trial, the court held that "[ilt would defeat the
purpose of the statute to deprive the court of potentially valuable informa-
tion submitted by an independent investigator by holding that the trial
court may not consider the report until it is formally introduced into evi-
dence by one of the parties."' 17 Furthermore, the court concluded that the
social study was a part of the trial court's record because it was on file with
the trial court." 8 The court, however, held that the extent to which the
report may be considered is different when the hearing is before a jury,
stating that the study "is before the court for all purposes, but only those
110. The report indicated that the Greens had adequate housing and were financially
and emotionally stable. It further stated that allegations of medical neglect and physical
abuse were not substantiated. The trial court made various findings of fact, none of which
specifically referred to the information contained in the social study. Two of the findings,
however, indicated that a social study was made, filed, and considered by the court without
objection. [d at 907.
111. Id. at 906.
112. 601 S.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980).
113. 608 S.W.2d at 906.
114. Id. at 909. The court cited three courts of civil appeals decisions that suggest that a
trial court must consider the social study in adoption cases even though it contains hearsay
information: Alexander v. Clower, 486 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no
writ); In re Jones, 475 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hickman v. Smith, 238-S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ refd). 608
S.W.2d at 909.
115. 608 S.W.2d at 908.
116. Id. at 907. The court quoted at length from § 11.12 of the Texas Family Code,
which allows a court to order the preparation of a social study whenever the parent-child
relationship may be affected. Id




portions of the study which are admissible under the rules of evidence may
be disclosed to the jury." 119
E. Reputation Evidence
A seemingly unsolicited response to a question can serve to allow the
introduction of harmful reputation evidence. In Minchen v. Rogers 12 0 the
plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for breach of a construction con-
tract and for violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff,12' and the defendant appealed.
On appeal the defendant claimed that the admission of testimony regard-
ing his reputation for truth and veracity in the community was improper.
At trial the defendant, in response to a question regarding the business
relationship between himself and the plaintiff, testified that as a business
man and as a human being, "the only thing I ever worried about was
maintaining an honest reputation."'' 2 2 The court of civil appeals held that
this testimony placed the defendant's reputation in issue and the plaintiff
was therefore entitled to offer harmful reputation testimony rebutting that
statement. 123
IV. UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF INTERESTED WITNESSES
The credibility of a witness is often a significant factor in determining
whether a fact has been conclusively proven or whether such evidence
merely raises an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. For example,
in Commercial Insurance Co. v. Smith,124 a workers' compensation case,
the defendant claimed that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice
and claim filing provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.' 2 Al-
though the evidence that the plaintiffs employer was aware of her occupa-
tional disease was uncontradicted, the question was whether the employer
had received notice within thirty days of the first distinct manifestation of
such disease. No jury issue was submitted on this question. The plaintiff
claimed that no issue was necessary because her supervisor admitted that
he had notice on the same day that she began to notice the problem and
reported it to her supervisor.
The Fort Worth court of civil appeals acknowledged that its obligation
was to review the evidence in the record to determine if the plaintiffs testi-
mony, combined with other evidence, was sufficient to establish conclu-
sively the fact that her employer had timely notice.126 After reviewing the
119. Id.
120. 596 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, no writ).
121. Id at 180.
122. Id at 182.
123. Id
124. 596 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). For a brief
discussion of this general area, see Beck, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J.
397, 407-10 (1979).
125. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(a) (Vernon 1967).
126. 596 S.W.2d at 664.
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record, the court followed the exception to the interested witness rule set
forth in Collora v. Navarro 127 and concluded that the plaintiffs testimony
"on the question of notice to her employer was clear, direct, positive and
uncontradicted" and that "we can find nothing in the record to cause any
reasonable suspicion as to its truth."' 128 Accordingly, it was unnecessary to
submit an issue to the jury and the trial court's judgment was considered
proper.
The dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Massey disagreed with the ma-
jority's conclusion that the plaintiff conclusively established timely notice
and claim. 129 The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs credibility was put
into question and therefore there was a necessity for a jury issue to be
submitted "because the question of when her first distinct manifestation
occurred was of such a subjective nature that Commercial could not read-
ily contradict or disprove her testimony." 130 Chief Judge Massey reasoned
that the basis for the exception to the interested witness rule relied on by
the majority was weakened when the testimony of the plaintiff could not
be readily contradicted even if untrue.
131
V. CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY
The sufficiency of the corroboration necessary for accomplice testimony
normally is determined by eliminating the testimony from consideration
and examining the remaining evidence to ascertain whether there is evi-
dence of an incriminating nature that tends to connect the accused with the
commission of the crime. If there is such evidence, the corroboration is
sufficient; if there is not, it is insufficient. 132 The presence of the accused in
the company of an accomplice shortly before or shortly after the commis-
sion of a crime is not, standing alone, sufficient corroboration. 133 The is-
sue in In re A. D.L. C 134 was whether the accomplice testimony of a child
participating in a felony offense was sufficiently corroborated. The trial
court found the child delinquent for engaging in delinquent conduct with
two other children who were allegedly his accomplices. 135 Reversing and
127. 574 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1978). Collora posits the following questions, the affirmative
answers to which can form the basis for accepting the testimony of an interested witness as
conclusively establishing a fact:
Is the testimony clear, direct, and positive? Is it internally consistent? Is it
contradicted or corroborated by other circumstances in the case? Is it contra-
dicted or corroborated by other witnesses? Does the opposing partypossess the
means to verify or dispute the testimony? Does he have a way to test the witness'
credibility? Did he make use of those means?
Id at 69 (emphasis added).
128. 596 S.W.2d at 665.
129. Id at 666.
130. Id
131. Id
132. See Hernandez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Ayala v. State, 511
S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
133. Ayala v. State, 511 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
134. 598 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
135. Id at 384.
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remanding the decision of the trial court, the court of civil appeals held
that the testimony of the accomplice witnesses was not corroborated suffi-
ciently by other evidence tending to connect the child with the alleged de-
linquent conduct.136 The court determined that when the accomplice
testimony of the two children was eliminated, the only remaining evidence
was the defendant's presence in the same city with the accomplices approx-
imately an hour and a half before the burglary; the evidence did not estab-
lish the proximity of the scene of the alleged conduct to the location in the
city where the children were seen together. 37
VI. TAPE RECORDINGS
Tape recordings are generally admissible upon establishing (1) that the
recording device was capable of taking testimony; (2) that the operator of
the device was competent; (3) the authenticity of the correctness of the
recording; (4) that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; (5)
the manner of the preservation of the recording; (6) the identification of
the speakers; and (7) that the testimony elicited was made voluntarily
without any kind of inducement. 138 Seymour v. Gillespie139 presented the
issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding a
tape recording of the conversation and sounds that occurred during an al-
leged assault and battery. The trial judge refused to admit the tape in
evidence because the tape was self-serving, the persons being recorded did
not identify themselves during the recording, one of the parties did not
know he was being recorded, and part of the tape was not understanda-
ble. ' 40 The court of civil appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the tape recording.
14
'
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did err
in excluding the evidence. 142 First, the court held that the plaintiff's objec-
tions to the predicate laid for the introduction of the tape recording were
too general and therefore were waived. 43 The court then held that the
recording of conversations by one party to the conversation constitutes
neither an invasion of privacy nor illegally obtained evidence. 44 The
136. Id at 385.
137. Id There was also evidence in the case that the father of one of the accomplices
was told that his son and the defendant were asleep in the same house approximately three
hours after the burglary.
138. See Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a discussion of this subject, see Beck, Evidence, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 369, 384-85 (1978).
139. 608 S.W.2d 897, 897 (Tex. 1980).
140. Id at 898.
141. 584 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979).
142. 608 S.W.2d at 899.
143. Id at 898. The defendant filed a motion in limine complaining that the tape in-
vaded the defendant's right of privacy, was made without his consent and permission, was
hearsay, and was illegally obtained evidence. The defendant subsequently complained that
the evidence in support of the introduction of the tape did not satisfy the requisites of Cum-




court distinguished the leading case of Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc. ,'145
stating that in the present case the testimony from each side was sharply
controverted and the tape recording was the only unbiased evidence avail-
able.' 46 Moreover, the court observed that in Cummings there was evi-
dence in addition to the testimony of the witness who was impeached by
the tape recording to support the contributory negligence findings against
the plaintiff; only under those circumstances did the Cummings court hold
that the exclusion of the tape was "at least discretionary."'' 47
VII. DAMAGES
In Texas the lost profits of a business may be recovered as damages only
if the business is shown to be established and profitable at the time of the
act complained of; lost profits in the future may not be recovered if the
business is new and unestablished. The rationale for this distinction is that
preexisting profits supply the requisite legal certainty as to both fact and
amount of damages, whereas anticipated profits of a new and unestab-
lished business leave too much to conjecture and speculation. 48 In Bell
Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw149 two helicopter passengers brought a prod-
ucts liability action. About four months before the accident, the plaintiffs
had opened an office devoted exclusively to the sale of farms and ranches.
To support one of the damage claims, one of the plaintiffs testified as to the
lost profits of the new business. The trial court entered judgment against
the manufacturer on the basis of the jury's findings, 150 and the manufac-
turer appealed. One of the contentions on appeal was that the trial court
erred in admitting the opinion testimony of the one plaintiff concerning
the projected income from the passengers' business of selling farms and
ranches. The basis of the objection was that the business had not been in
existence for a sufficient time to support such an opinion. The court of
civil appeals rejected the manufacturer's contention and held that the evi-
dence showed that the passenger had an interest in the selling of farms and
ranches at least three years prior to the formal establishment of an office
devoted exclusively to such sales.' 5' The court therefore ruled that the
rationale of the new and unestablished business cases was inapplicable.15 2
In Bedgood v. Madalin 153 the Texas Supreme Court held that testimony
concerning the plaintiffs' pecuniary loss by reason of the death of their son
was "too remote and speculative to have probative force." 54 The court
145. 445 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, writ refed n.r.e.).
146. 608 S.W.2d at 899.
147. Id
148. See, e.g., Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 427, 115 S.W.2d 1097,
1098-99 (1938); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d 180, 188-89
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965), writ refdn.r.e per curiam, 403 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1966).
149. 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
150. Id at 524-25.
151. Id at 536.
152. Id
153. 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980).
154. Id. at 776.
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decided that the testimony necessarily assumed that an eleven-year-old
boy "would maintain his interest in studying to be a doctor, successfully
pursue his education and be licensed as such, decide to practice medicine
in Corpus Christi, and have the type of practice that he could make refer-
rals of heart patients to his father's clinic which would still be in opera-
tion." 55 Even though the court recognized that a trial court has broad
discretion in this area, the court held that the testimony was beyond all
reasonable boundaries. 156
VIII. JURY MISCONDUCT 157
Jury misconduct requires a finding of fact that the misconduct occurred
and a legal conclusion that the misconduct was material and that, based on
the record as a whole, the misconduct probably resulted in harm to the
complaining party. 158 Although the finding of fact is tested by the suffi-
ciency of the evidence standard, the legal conclusion of probable harm
may be determined by the appellate court. 5 9 In reviewing a claim of jury
misconduct, the appellate court will presume that the jury obeyed the in-
structions of the trial court and disregarded the existence of such improper
subjects as insurance. 160 Moreover, many improper statements are capable
of being corrected by means of additional instructions.' 6 1
Several cases during the survey period dealt with the evidence necessary
to establish jury misconduct. In Strange v. Treasure City, 16 2 a false impris-
onment case, the trial court overruled the defendant's amended motion for
a new trial after four jurors testified regarding the jury's deliberations. 163
On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court erred in overruling its
amended motion for a new trial because jury misconduct was the only
conclusion that could be supported by the record. The court of civil ap-
peals examined the record and determined that the foreman and one juror
testifed that during deliberations the jurors discussed numerous matters
that were improper. 164 Another juror summoned by the plaintiff stated
that he recalled a discussion about attorneys' fees and wages but testified
155. Id
156. Id.
157. For a general discussion of this subject, see Keltner, Jury Misconduct in Texas.-
Trying the Trier of Fact, 34 Sw. L.J. 1131 (1981).
158. See, e.g., Crawford v. Detering Co., 150 Tex. 140, 237 S.W.2d 615 (1951).
159. See City of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S.W.2d 259 (1944).
160. See Duncan v. Smith, 393 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1965).
161. See Younger Bros. v. Myers, 159 Tex. 585, 324 S.W.2d 546 (1959).
162. 608 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1980).
163. Id at 605.
164. 590 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979). These matters included: (1)
whether the defendant or an insurance company would pay the money judgment; (2)
whether the plaintiffs attorney had a contingent fee contract and would receive one-third of
any money awarded; (3) whether any money awarded would be tax free; (4) whether the
plaintiff, a black man, had "gotten a fair shake"; (5) whether two days' lost wages to try this
case and wages for another day lost for deposition purposes, trebled, was a better way to
assess damages than to follow the court's charge; and (6) a juror's statement during delibera-
tions that "she had personal reasons to give as much money as possible" to the plaintiff. Id
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that the jury foreman cut off extended discussion. The court concluded
that "the fact of misconduct is established in that the testimony of two
jurors is full and explicit and the misconduct is not denied by the remain-
ing jurors, just unrecalled."' 165 Thus, the court held that the record com-
pelled the legal conclusion that the misconduct of the jury was of such a
nature and degree that a fair trial had been denied.' 66
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision. First, the
court stated that because the trial court did not make any specific findings
of fact as to whether the misconduct occurred, it must be "presumed that
the trial court found that such misconduct did not occur, provided there is
evidence to support such a finding.' 1 67 The court then discussed the evi-
dence to determine if there was evidentiary support for such a presumed
finding. The court separated the alleged misconduct into the categories of
lost wages, statements of personal bias, taxes, attorneys' fees, and insur-
ance, all of which were subjects supposedly discussed during the jury's de-
liberations.168 Although the statement of personal bias by one of the
jurors was determined to constitute material misconduct, the court con-
cluded that it did not result in probable injury because "[tihe statement
was not repeated, it was not discussed by other jurors, and no further ex-
planation was offered by [the juror who had made the statement]."' 69
With respect to the jurors' lost wages discussion, the court followed the
"trial court's implied finding that this specific act of misconduct did not
occur"170 because the jurors' testimony was conflicting and inconsistent. 71
The court ruled that the remaining items of alleged misconduct either did
not constitute misconduct, were not material, or did not result in probable
harm.' 72 Finally, the court concluded that the defendant failed to estab-
lish that the cumulative effect of all of these acts resulted in probable in-
jury. 173
IX. PAROL EVIDENCE
The parol evidence rule states that in the absence of fraud, accident, or
mistake, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms
165. Id
166. Id at 817-18. In another jury misconduct case, Bailey v. Tuck, 591 S.W.2d 605
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), three jurors remembered certain occurrences
that were improper, while two jurors stated that such occurrences did not take place. Be-
cause the evidence in Bailey was conflicting, the court ruled that the factual determination
by the trial court as to whether misconduct occurred was binding on appeal. Id at 608. See
also White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200 (1947), and Pryor v. New St.
Anthony Hotel Co., 146 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ ref'd), in
which the fact of misconduct was conclusively shown.
167. 608 S.W.2d at 606.
168. Id at 606-09.
169. Id at 607-08.
170. Id at 607.
171. Id
172. Id. at 608-09.
173. Id at 609.
19811
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
of a written instrument.174 In Cove Investments, Inc. v. Manges, 75 how-
ever, the plaintiff, seeking to recover a mineral interest in land, introduced
parol evidence to establish that mineral deeds were given for purposes
other than that stated in the instruments. Notwithstanding such extrinsic
evidence, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.' 76 In order to be entitled to
summary judgment, the defendants had to establish that the deeds were
nullities and were ineffectual as a matter of law to convey any right, title,
or interest to the plaintiff. Reversing and remanding the decisions below,
the Texas Supreme Court held that a material fact issue existed as to
whether two mineral deeds given by one of the defendants to the plaintiff
were intended to be effective as security interests for that defendant's per-
formance of an oral promise to convey minerals to the plaintiff. 77 The
supreme court stated that when parol evidence is admitted to establish a
prior or simultaneous oral agreement showing a different purpose for a
deed, the courts will determine and give effect to that oral agreement. 178
The court then held that the admission by the defendant that the deeds
were given as security for performance was sufficient to negate the asser-
tion in his action for summary judgment that no right, title, or interest was
conveyed by the deeds.' 79
An alleged contractual ambiguity was used as the basis for the introduc-
tion of parol evidence in Crozier v. Home Children Maintenance & Educa-
tional Trust,180 in which the plaintiff brought suit seeking recission of a
contract for the purchase of real property. The question of ambiguity did
not arise until one of the plaintiffs witnesses completed his testimony.
Subsequently, the trial court began to allow the introduction of testimony
to explain the written contract by evidence of prior negotiations, unexe-
cuted previous contractual drafts, and circumstances surrounding the ne-
gotiations. The trial court allowed this testimony apparently under the
theory that in order to pass properly on the question of ambiguity, the
court needed to hear extrinsic evidence. Even though neither party alleged
that the contract in dispute was in any way ambiguous, the trial court, over
the defendant's objections, allowed the introduction of parol evidence and
rescinded the contract. 81 The disputed issue on appeal was whether the
plaintiff tendered at the time of the closing full performance of the contract
of sale or whether, as the defendant contended, the plaintiffs tender was
materially defective. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered
judgment for the defendant on his cross claim, holding that the contract of
174. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955).
175. 602 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1980).
176. 588 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979).
177. 602 S.W.2d at 517.
178. Id.; see, e.g., Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974); Jackson v. Her-
nandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1955); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Atwood, 150 Tex.
617, 244 S.W.2d 637 (1951).
179. 602 S.W.2d at 517.
180. 597 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
181. Id at 418-19.
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sale was not ambiguous on its face, that there were no pleadings to support
a judgment on the basis of ambiguity, and that, therefore, the trial court
erred in permitting parol evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the
contract involved. ' 82
An ambiguity in a lease was the basis for the admissibility of parol evi-
dence in Fort Worth Neuropsychiatric Hospital, Inc. v. Bee Jay Corp. 183 In
that case the plaintiff corporation brought suit against a hospital corpora-
tion to recover for breach of an oral agreement allegedly occurring when
the hospital evicted a doctor-tenant from his offices. The doctor-tenant
initially owned all of the stock in both the plaintiff-corporation and the
hospital. In 1969 the doctor entered into a written lease with the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the plaintiff and the doctor conveyed their respective inter-
ests to the hospital. The alleged oral agreement between the plaintiff and
the hospital was that the 1969 lease was to continue, that the doctor was to
remain in possession of the premises, and that the plaintiff was to receive
the rents. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
the court of civil appeals affirmed.' 84 The supreme court, however, re-
versed and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff, holding
that the evidence conclusively established that the hospital did not breach
its oral agreement with the plaintiff by evicting the doctor from his hospital
offices. 185 As part of its proof, the plaintiff introduced into evidence its
1969 lease with the doctor. Because the lease mistakenly described the lot
and block numbers of the demised premises, the plaintiff also introduced
the testimony of the doctor to explain the parties' intentions concerning the
demised premises. The court, citing Smith v. Liddell, 86 stated the general
rule that in interpreting a lease, parol evidence is not admissible to deter-
mine the premises that were rented.1 87 The court further stated, however,
that when a lease contains a description of the demised premises that is so
general that it describes more than one location, the lease contains a latent
182. Id at 425. Similarly, in Warren Bros. v. A.A.A. Pipe Cleaning Co., 601 S.W.2d 436
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.), the plaintiff brought suit to
recover for certain pipecleanin$ services furnished the defendant. After judgment was en-
tered on the verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant contended on appeal that the trial court
erred in admitting testimony that the second purchase order was intended only to cover
cleaning small lines. The defendant objected that such testimony violated the parol evi-
dence rule inasmuch as the purchase order by its terms did not confine the plaintiff's work
merely to the small lines running across the highway. The witness testified that it was the
intent of the purchase order that the plaintiff clean only the small sewer lines. The court of
civil appeals held that the testimony of the witness was properly admitted. Id at 439. The
court stated that on its face the purchase order did not appear to be a complete embodiment
of the terms relating to the agreement between the parties, but rather an "incomplete memo-
rial or memorandum." Id The court further noted that the purchase order was "so general
as to logically encompass either of the two interpretations offered by the parties." Id The
court therefore held that because the application of pertinent rules of interpretation allowed
two or more meanings, parol evidence was admissible to explain the interest of the parties.
Id
183. 600 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1980).
184. 587 S.W.2d 746, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979).
185. 600 S.W.2d at 767.
186. 367 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1963).
187. 600 S.W.2d at 766.
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ambiguity; l88 in such an instance, the language of the lease, though clear
on its face, cannot be enforced without raising doubts concerning the loca-
tion of the premises. The court found such an ambiguity in this case,189
and held that when such a latent ambiguity arises in the course of inter-
preting and enforcing a lease, parol evidence is admissible to resolve the
doubts and identify the premises that were leased. 190 Accordingly, the
court stated that the doctor was "uniquely situated to answer the inquiry
concerning the parties' intentions" because he executed the lease on his
own behalf and on behalf of the plaintiff.'91 Because only he testified as to
the parties' intent and because his testimony was unequivocal, the intent of
the parties, which was favorable to the plaintiff, was undisputed.
The primary inquiry in interpreting a will is to determine the intent of
the testator,' 92 and review is normally limited to the words of the will it-
self.' 93 Extrinsic evidence generally is admissible only to demonstrate the
situation of the testator, the circumstances existing when the will was exe-
cuted, and other material facts that may enable the court to place itself in
the testator's position at the time of the execution of the will. 194 In Gee v.
Read'95 the plaintiff sought to go beyond the four corners of the will to
explain the testator's intent. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendant because the will unambiguously left all of the decedent's
property to her surviving sister.196 The court of civil appeals, however,
reversed and remanded, ruling that the will was ambiguous and, therefore,
extrinsic evidence was admissible to aid in interpreting the will. 197 The
supreme court affirmed the decision of the court of civil appeals and held
that the decedent's will did not on its face unambiguously leave all her
property to the surviving sister; parol evidence therefore was admissible. 98
Similarly, in Rutherford v. Randall,199 which involved the interpretation
of a mineral deed, the plaintiffs claimed that the mineral deed contained
conflicting provisions regarding the interest conveyed. The trial court re-
jected this contention and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that only a 1/240th interest in the minerals had been
conveyed as opposed to the 1/24th interest urged by the plaintiffs. 2°° The
court of civil appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.20'
188. Id.
189. At the time the lease was executed, there were three buildings that were known as
1066 West Magnolia Avenue: the two clinics owned by the plaintiff and the hospital build-
ing owned by the doctor in his individual capacity.
190. 600 S.W.2d at 766.
191. Id
192. Powers v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Tex. 604, 616, 161 S.W.2d 273, 281 (1942).
193. Huffman v. Huffman, 161 Tex. 267, 270, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (1960).
194. Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex. 1971).
195. 606 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1980).
196. Id at 679.
197. 580 S.W.2d 431, 434-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979).
198. 606 S.W.2d at 681.
199. 593 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1980).
200. Id. at 951.
201. 577 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979).
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Because there was a fact issue concerning the extent of the mineral interest
that the grantor intended to convey, the court held that extrinsic evidence
could properly be considered to determine the intent of the grantor.20 2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of civil
appeals and affirmed the decision of the trial court. 20 3 The court held that
the deed unambiguously conveyed only a 1/240th mineral interest as op-
posed to the interest claimed by the plaintiffs.2°4 Thus, the absence of any
ambiguity in the deed precluded any consideration of extrinsic evidence
concerning the original intent of the grantor.
Parol evidence is also admissible to prove the nonexistence of a contract.
For example, in Merbitz v. Great National L!fe Insurance Co. 205 the insurer
brought suit for a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for benefits
under the life insurance policy of an insured who committed suicide. The
trial court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of the insurer,2° 6 and
the defendant appealed. The court of civil appeals held that parol evi-
dence was admissible to show the nonexistence of the policy, rather than
for the purpose of varying the terms of an existing contract. 20 7
Id
593 S.W.2d at 953.
Id.
599 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id at 657.
Id at 658. See also Baker v. Baker, 143 Tex. 191, 183 S.W.2d 724 (1944).
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